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Abstract
Belfast seems well known as a violent city; it has experienced a long history of turmoil related to the British
invasion and subsequent division based on ethnicity as seen through religion. Although the profile of the city
has improved, meaning rising tourism and income, the Belfast Agreement of 1998, as well as divisions
between ethnicities continues to haunt the city despite an apparent end to violence, fighting and paramilitary
activity. This paper explores the relationship between violence and space as exemplified in Belfast through the
‘peacelines’ which stand in interface zones between Catholic and Protestant residential areas. As well as being
physical barriers, the peacelines are also symbolic of segregation as it manifests itself in other ways; through
the ways in which people move through space and the ways in which bodies and identity are reflections of the
city. The process of gentrification is also explored in the context of Belfast, with recent literature suggesting
that class conflict exists alongside ethnic conflict.
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Frontier Wars: Violence and Space 
in Belfast, Northern Ireland. 
 
Jack Boulton 
 
“The course of instruction 
treated subsequent historical 
conflict as the rift between a 
geographically inspired 
cultural-economic separatism 
and outside forces such as 
Christianity, British 
colonialism, and capitalism. 
These interlopers were 
depicted as undoing what 
geography had created. This 
ongoing confrontation was 
traced to sophisticated 
political concepts, but its 
polarised patterning repeated 
in other forms the geographic 
splintering of the Ice Age 
event.” (Feldman 1991:17) 
 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, remains one 
of the most segregated cities in the world 
(Murtagh 2008). Whilst violence may have 
been sidelined by politicians in the hope that 
it might be forgotten, in the borderlands of 
the city it is still very much a common 
occurrence. The aim of this paper will be to 
explore how violence is connected to space, 
with a particular focus on Belfast. Of course, 
many other cities are also divided – for 
example Jerusalem (Israel and Palestine) and 
Nicosia (Cyprus). However Belfast is an 
interesting case because its example is often 
used as a template for successful protection 
against sectarian violence, most notably US-
controlled Baghdad after the invasion of Iraq 
(Byrne 2012). The literature also reveals that 
the physical barriers between communities 
also belie division based on class and 
relative wealth as well as politics. There is 
also an indication that the perception of 
ethnic fighting and division is changing as 
new generations take on the burden of 
conflict.  
 The first section of the paper will 
look at the interface zones and peacelines as 
physical barricades to violence, using work 
by Feldman (1991), Anderson and 
Shuttleworth (2003) and Byrne (2012). 
Following this is a look at how perceptions 
of prior conflict and ethnic division have 
manifested themselves in the present day. 
There is a specific focus in this section on 
masculine identity, and reference is made to 
work by Roche (2012) and Lysaght and 
Basten (2003), both of whom suggest that 
historical violence has found new forms of 
expression in the lives of men who were not 
involved in the conflicts of the past 
generation. The remainder of the paper shifts 
slightly in tone in an effort to describe how 
gentrification has altered the nature of 
conflict, using work by Watson (2009) and 
Carter (2003).  
 
Segregated Space in Belfast 
The first ‘peacelines’ in Belfast were 
constructed in 1969 amid growing inter-
ethnic conflict between Catholic and 
Protestant districts in the city in a period 
known – perhaps euphemistically – as “The 
Troubles”. As Doherty and Poole (1997) 
point out, “The Troubles” were not the 
beginning of ethnic conflict in Ireland, but 
“the most recent outpourings from an 
intermittently active vent of violence that 
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was added to the already turbulent landscape 
of Irish political conflict by the arrival of 
immigrant British settlers in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries” (1997:1). 
Doherty and Poole continue by stating that 
one of the legacies of the invasion is that in 
contemporary times, Irish society is still 
divided along the lines of ‘settler-native’ 
(1997:1), with the minority Catholic 
population being the ‘natives’ and the 
English/Scottish Protestants being the 
‘settlers’. Whilst most Catholics favour a 
united Ireland, the majority of Protestants 
wish to remain in union with the United 
Kingdom (Doherty and Poole 1997). 
Feldman (1991) believes that the rise 
in sectarian violence in Belfast in the late 
1960s resulted in huge relocations of 
working-class populations, with the main 
sites of movement being “ethnically mixed 
working class sectors of the city and those 
small ethnically homogeneous districts that 
bordered on the larger sectarian enclaves of 
the opposing ethnic group” (1991:23). 
Movement was either a result of the fear of 
impending violence, the result of actual 
violence or threats, or the residual effect of 
overcrowding that occurred as people moved 
to ‘safer ground’. In the latter situation, 
people of differing ethnicity would often be 
forced from their homes to make way for 
inbound populaces (Feldman 1991). 
Built by the British army, the 
peacewalls were originally meant as a short 
term measure, however many still remain 
despite an apparent end (at least on paper) to 
the conflict with the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement in 1998. Strangely there 
is no consensus on how many peacewalls 
currently exist – the Northern Ireland Office 
states 53, UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron stated 48 in 2011, and in 2012 
independent research concluded that there 
were 99 (Byrne 2012). Regardless of how 
many lines currently exist, Shawn 
Pogatchnik wrote in a 2008 USA Today 
article that the number of peacewalls has 
risen rather than decreased since the end of 
the conflict. Byrne (2012) posits that this is 
despite previous attempts by government to 
reduce the physical embodiments of security 
policy, including the removal of 
checkpoints, army patrols, and the phasing 
out of the “ring of steel,” which was 
designed to protect Belfast city centre from 
potential terrorist attack (2012:12-13). 
Murtagh (2008) suggests that in part this is 
because of the increasing divide between the 
rich and the poor: “a twin speed city has 
emerged in the last decade,” he writes, “in 
which those with education and skills are 
doing well in key growth sectors whilst 
those without resources are increasingly 
corralled in ‘sink’ estates, stratified by 
poverty, segregation and fear” (2008:4). The 
peacewalls remain contested; a 2007 survey 
of residents near the walls found that the 
boundaries served to promote an air of 
safety and protection. However the same 
survey also found that the majority of 
participants thought that the walls should 
come down if circumstance favoured it, with 
only 17% of respondents wishing that the 
walls remained standing indefinitely 
(Macaulay 2008). 
  
Peacelines and Violence 
In a seminal and classic ethnography 
of violence in Northern Ireland written 
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before the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, 
Feldman (1991) suggests that the interface 
zones themselves (at that time, at least) were 
“spatial construct[s] pre-eminently linked to 
the performance of violence” (1991:28). 
Feldman states that riots that occurred at 
interface zones (before the erection of 
formal barriers) were a customary way for 
setting boundaries, citing ceremonial 
marches as an equivalent gesture for the 
demarcating of space (1991). In 1968, peace 
walls were erected along some of the most 
notorious sites of sectarian violence, 
effectively separating the two ethnic groups. 
For Feldman though, the erection of these 
peace walls did little to halt violence, and if 
anything they possibly exacerbated the 
issue. He states “the politically charged 
interface ceased to be an expression of 
community identity and began to regulate 
community experience. Communities 
became hostages to their barricades and their 
ossified boundaries, if not actively violated 
by their spaces of inclusion” (1991:31). 
 Whereas the interface zones had 
been primarily a cognitive boundary based 
on knowledge of local geography, the peace 
walls were a formal separation imposed by 
the state. The interface zones were, in 
essence, contested space and although 
temporary boundaries were often erected by 
local residents these were easily broken 
down. The building of permanent, 
unbreakable walls was a state effort (either 
purposely or not) to define and bureaucratise 
violent space though ‘making it safe’. As 
Hoffman suggests, “states undertake projects 
of distinguishing the legal from the illegal, 
the legitimate from the illegitimate, the licit 
from the illicit. States territorialise” 
(2011:8). Feldman draws on Lacan (1977) 
when he posits that the effect of the peace 
walls was to reorganise space into a “mirror 
relation” (1991:35) whereby for each group, 
the opposite side of the barricade became 
seen as ‘outside’, and one’s own side 
became a sanctuary (Feldman 1991). This 
organisation melds together several cultural 
strands so that they become 
indistinguishable and inseparable: 
 
“… the topographic, the 
tactical, and the ideological 
were fused into a mobilising 
spectacle which channelled 
the perception and 
performance of violent 
exchanges. Political 
representation and spatial 
order constituted a single 
interactive and mutually 
sustaining social structure for 
the reproduction of violence. 
The fusion of the historical 
and the spatial by new levels 
of symbolic investment 
generated the political 
autonomy of space… within 
this spatial metaphysic, 
political interest, utilitarian 
ideologies, and strategies of 
political manipulation could 
not be artificially separated 
from their symbolisation in 
topological coordinates.” 
(Feldman 1991:36) 
Feldman continues his discussion of the 
peacewalls by describing the 
‘sanctuary/interface/adversary’ system which 
he believes should be understood as both a 
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top-down and bottom-up organisational and 
classificatory system. That is, that it was 
both the way the system was experienced 
and the way it was classified by the state 
(1991). By keeping violent interaction at the 
peacewalls, the sanctuary became 
“constituted by a space that was reserved for 
residence and kinship” (1991:36). Therefore 
the sanctuary/interface system was not 
simply a means of defence against the 
‘adversary’, but also a method of containing 
confrontational violence in a specific place; 
“an explicit attempt to territorialise violence, 
to maintain the institution of the interface as 
the prescribed place of violence” (1991:37). 
 Although violence in Northern 
Ireland has subsided since the IRA ceasefire 
of 1994 and the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998 – in which the 
multilateral relationships between Northern 
Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom were laid out – for many 
residents of Belfast, violence is still a day-to-
day occurrence. Sluka (2009) believes that 
despite the Agreement, paramilitary activity 
still occurs, albeit at a much reduced rate, 
and that 
 
“… there is no peace in 
Northern Ireland now… the 
peace process has not been 
successfully completed… the 
prognosis for the future of the 
gun and political violence in 
Northern Ireland is not good. 
History and Ulster-Protestant 
political culture strongly 
suggest that the most likely 
future scenario is a resurgence 
of loyalist violence and a 
renewed paramilitary threat, 
rather than a real and lasting 
peace.” (Sluka 2009:282) 
 
Although Queen Elizabeth II visited Dublin 
in 2011 as a gesture of goodwill between the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, Sluka’s 
analysis was proved correct by newspaper 
reports, including one by Adam Gabbatt and 
Henry McDonald in The Guardian dated 17 
May 2011, of a bomb discovered on a bus on 
the day of the visit. In a Guardian article 
dated 16 May 2011, Vikram Dodd and 
Henry McDonald also report that threats 
were made to authorities in the United 
Kingdom of a bomb in central London. In 
addition to paramilitary activity, Anderson 
and Shuttleworth (2003) state that low level 
street violence is also a regular occurrence in 
Northern Ireland, particularly Belfast. 
Anderson and Shuttleworth (2002) 
believe that left behind after the Agreement 
is the notion of ‘territoriality,’ stating 
“territoriality entails the use of bordered 
geographic spaces to include and exclude, to 
control, influence and express relationships 
of power. It is seen most strongly at national 
state level but also within regions and more 
informally or unofficially in local 
communities and neighbourhoods” (2002:2). 
In the case of Belfast, Anderson and 
Shuttleworth believe territoriality “depends 
on violence, or more immediately the threat 
rather than actuality of violence, for the 
enforcement of claims to territory and the 
exclusion of the ‘enemy’ may require 
relatively few violent episodes to induce the 
necessary fear” (2002:2). However they 
believe that in contemporary Belfast the 
consequences of violence are not seen in 
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face-to-face combat but in the effect that 
historical violence has on the everyday lives 
of people not involved with it directly 
(2002). Anderson and Shuttleworth believe 
that whilst statistics concerning residential 
patterns in Belfast indicate that segregation 
has in fact worsened since 1998, patterns of 
employment suggest otherwise (2002). This 
is supported by research by Shuttleworth et 
al (2004), which proposes that non-
residential relationships such as those formed 
at work and in clubs and societies were 
deemed more important than those forged in 
the residential sphere, whilst mixed leisure 
facilities also provided spaces in which 
members of apparently opposing ethnicities 
could, and did, socialise together. 
 Through this very brief look at the 
origins of the peacewalls and the 
relationship between different ethnic 
identities in Belfast, we can see that whilst 
the barriers were originally intended to stop 
violence, in fact they served to formalise, 
symbolise, and in some respects heighten, 
the differences between each side. Whilst 
politically motivated violence in Northern 
Ireland has certainly decreased since 1998, 
more recent research has looked at the effect 
of historical sectarianism on youth 
populations within Belfast (most particularly 
men), and it is that which we shall move to 
now.  
 
Segregation and Violence 
Space is immutably connected to the 
body. Bodies adorned in a certain way in 
certain spaces will look out of place, making 
them wholly visible to those who understand 
the signs. Speaking of the relation between 
body and space in Kinshasa, DRC, De 
Boeck states “the manner of production of 
space and time in the city is thus 
inextricably connected with the production 
of the body. Body and society reflect and are 
mirrored in each other” (2004:7). In Belfast, 
this cultural understanding is the product of 
a specific history of bodies interacting in 
space marked out by violence. The ability to 
recognise bodily markers which connect an 
individual to a certain space has become a 
skill which is used almost daily. This 
happens in a variety of contexts which are 
not linked directly to sectarian violence but 
demonstrate how historical segregation 
expresses itself in the present day. 
 Lysaght (2002) proposes that 
working class males in Belfast are partaking 
in performances of particular kinds of 
masculinity. Relating this concept to the 
work of Feldman (1991) and his description 
of space connected to peacelines as 
‘‘sanctuary/interface/adversary,” Lysaght 
proposes two slightly different performances 
within the sanctuary space and outside it. 
Within the sanctuary, Lysaght posits that 
performance is based on “hegemonic 
masculinity” (2002:54) in which males who 
choose to join paramilitary groups are 
perceived as being part of a dominant male 
group, the hegemony of which is reinforced 
through intimidation of non-members. This 
will often involve the questioning of the 
masculinity or heterosexuality of non-
paramilitary males, and defining them as 
people “who avoided doing their duty, 
leaving it all up to us” (Lysaght 32002:54). 
 In contrast, Lysaght points out that 
males who choose to be non-combatants 
stress the individuality of their actions, 
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stating that fights they are involved in are 
one-on-one and that they are not able to call 
on “the team” (2002:54) in order to afflict 
retribution. Lysaght also posits that in fact 
this form of action (calling on the team) is 
not an acceptable form of behaviour for 
paramilitary members: “though the ‘team’ 
could be used to teach the non-combatant a 
lesson, this form of violence is not valued in 
the official rhetoric of paramilitary 
organisations which privilege their position 
as community defenders and honourable 
men” (2002:54). 
 Outside of the sanctuary area – at the 
border and beyond – Lysaght believes that a 
different performance of masculinity takes 
place, in which hegemonic and subordinate 
masculinities become blurred. Stating that 
fear can be a way of expressing masculinity, 
Lysaght postulates that in areas external to 
the sanctuary, “behaviour… is guided by an 
essentialist reading of space and the people 
who inhabit it. It involves the adoption of an 
approach to personal survival that is guided 
by an assumption of threat regardless of 
paramilitary involvement or of the reality of 
patterns of known violence” (2002:57-58). 
In a similar way to that described by Roche 
(2012) and outlined above, males in 
particular become able to judge who is a 
potential threat based on characteristics such 
as age, gender, clothes, stature and the 
places that people are known to be 
associated with. Lysaght (2002) believes 
that this results in non-combatants adopting 
behaviour patterns similar to those of 
members of paramilitary groups. In this 
sense then, the peacewalls, as both symbolic 
and physical differentiators of space, also 
impact on the identities of the people living 
amongst them.  
 In the context of violence and the 
perceived threat of violence, people 
themselves become part of the urban 
landscape. The threat of violence has an 
impact on how individuals will negotiate 
travelling through the city, and a study by 
Lysaght and Basten (2003) explored how 
individuals negotiate space perceived as 
violent, particularly how members of one 
side of the sectarian divide felt and coped 
when forced to cross space denoted as 
belonging to the other. They believe that 
although fear of violence is often portrayed 
as being dealt with in a one-time decision, 
i.e. moving out of the area, in fact 
supposedly violent spaces are negotiated on 
a daily basis (2003). The authors suggest 
that in Belfast although residents often claim 
that “there is little or no contact with 
neighbouring districts” (Lysaght and Basten 
2003:6), in fact people have fairly detailed 
information about others who live over the 
divide. Moreover, this is not strictly limited 
to leading paramilitary figures but also 
extends to less high profile individuals 
(2003). What is clear is that whilst the 
peacewalls are intended to keep 
communities separate, in fact the opposite is 
true. Communities are defined in relation to 
each other, and moreover, there is regular 
contact between them. Because of the 
perceived historical differences between 
these groups, these interactions are often 
formed around violence.  
 Lysaght and Basten (2003) point out 
that the crossing of ‘enemy territory’ is not a 
rare occurrence; in fact it happens fairly 
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often. More detail is also given about the 
mingling of different ethnic groups. Based 
on detailed interviews, Lysaght and Basten 
suggest that there is frequent interaction 
between the Catholic and Protestant 
communities, for example in cross 
community schemes and confrontation 
surrounding sporting events. In the latter, 
rather than hooliganism the authors describe 
a situation in which the Rangers, a 
Protestant favoured football team won a 
match, and men in a Protestant pub 
telephoned a pub favoured by Catholics in 
order to taunt them by singing down the 
telephone. 
 Individuals develop coping strategies 
to deal with crossing territory denoted as 
belonging to the rival ethnic group, the most 
obvious of which is to avoid it completely. 
Parents will also instruct children on which 
parts of the city they are allowed to enter 
and which they must not (Lysaght and 
Basten 2003). The authors point out though 
that “access to shared services necessitates 
that many people must regularly enter into 
‘other’ neighbouring districts. It may be 
possible not to use a library, but other daily 
activities are essential and leave people with 
little choice.” (2003:8) In situations such as 
this, individuals make use of several 
mechanisms to reduce the visibility of their 
ethnic identity, such as not wearing specific 
items of clothing (e.g. football shirts or 
school uniforms) and not using certain 
language by which ethnicity could be 
identified. Names are often changed or not 
used, especially certain names that are easily 
attributed to a particular ethnicity, for 
example ‘Mairead’ is a typically Catholic 
name and ‘Billy’ typically Protestant (2002). 
The authors also indicate that people 
travelling through areas belonging to the 
other ethnic group will also follow different 
paths each time they pass through in order to 
reduce the likelihood of being attacked 
(2002).    
 As well as travelling through space 
defined as belonging to ‘the other’, 
inhabitants of segregated spaces may also 
have to pass through areas that are 
categorically defined as ‘no man’s land’, 
that is, not belonging to either group. 
Lysaght and Basten point out that in fact, 
this space becomes sectarianised as it is 
used, and specific behaviours emerge 
primarily as defensive strategies. For 
example, people from one group will walk 
on one side of the road and cross at a 
particular set of traffic lights. Knowledge of, 
and adherence to, these routinised 
behaviours means that the actions, and the 
people carrying them out, once more 
become invisible (2003). 
 Linking this back to Lysaght’s 
previous work (2002), there is a common 
theme of people becoming part of the urban 
landscape, being visible through certain 
behaviours and markers (e.g. clothes) and 
invisible through others. The ability to do 
this, and to recognise others doing it, is a 
learning process (Roche 2012). It infers a 
close relationship between the body and the 
city – this certainly true in Belfast.  
 Roche (2012) believes that although 
current violence in Belfast often has 
sectarian overtones, in fact it is often more 
related to rites of passage and the process of 
young people, especially men, in becoming 
“hardened” (2012:197). Roche suggests that 
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fighting is a learning process, “helping to 
cement a young man’s sense of selfhood in 
relation to his own community” (2012:202). 
The author makes a distinction between 
‘high level’ and ‘low level’ violence, with 
the former being related to political aims and 
paramilitary groups, and the latter to 
destructive behaviour by youths. In low 
level violence such as street fighting, insults 
based in sectarianism may be used to 
provoke or heighten a fight. More 
particularly, however, it is through 
understanding these markers and cues that 
help in connecting a fighting participant to 
his peers and also in presenting himself to 
the person he is challenging. Therefore 
knowing which insults to use against whom, 
and what reaction they will elicit, is often 
more important than the simple use of the 
words themselves. Young men also learn to 
identify individuals who may pose a threat 
as well as the locations to be avoided in 
order to circumvent conflict (2012). This is a 
present day manifestation of sectarianism as 
physically embodied in the peacewalls. 
“Like an extra pinch of gunpowder, 
sectarian cues are often used merely to give 
a situation a ‘wee bit more pow’” posits 
Roche (2012:201), stating that “young 
people in Northern Ireland should be 
considered within the historical context of 
ethno-political conflict and violence that has 
surrounded them throughout their lives” 
(2012:207). This suggests that conflict 
provides an established tradition amongst 
young people in Belfast, which in many 
ways is reinforced by the continued 
separation of Catholics and Protestants. As 
Feldman suggests, “the past takes objectified 
form in the immediacy of spatial cognition” 
(1991:27). 
 It is possible to see, then, that male 
identity, and the forms of masculinity that 
are displayed in Belfast, are often formed in 
relation to social divisions as embodied by 
the peacewalls. More recently, however, a 
new process of social division has also 
started to shape this violence: gentrification. 
 
Changing Divisions 
The city of Belfast has been 
changing over the past decade or so, 
particularly with the rise of a gentrified city 
centre. As Murtagh suggests, ‘the rise of a 
new middle-class population, 
disproportionately Catholic, has colonised 
suburban neighbourhoods, already 
established wealthy areas, and the gentrified 
middle-city’ (2008:5).  
 Whilst the gentrification of Belfast is 
an attempt to move away from its violent 
past, Murtagh believes that what is occurring 
is a commercialisation and commodification 
not only of the city centre as a physical 
space of consumption, but also of the violent 
past itself. “Here ethnicity and race are 
urban assets; a resource to be commodified 
rather than a problem to be treated” 
(Murtagh 2008:9). Murtagh posits that 
neutral, non-offensive images of the past are 
used to create a vision of Belfast as a safe 
city. Much of this is imagery is based on 
Belfast's industrial history, “with the Titanic 
Quarter and the Linen Quarter joining the 
Cathedral Quarter and the University 
Quarter to create connected, if at times 
unauthentic zones of navigable and safe 
places” (2008:9). Cebulla and Smith (1995) 
add that the issue is further confounded by 
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the fact that in the process of gentrification, 
a collapse in Belfast’s manufacturing 
industry meant a large proportion of 
Belfast’s working class community were left 
dependent on state benefits whilst the city 
was restructured for a more affluent 
consumer.  
 One such attempt to ‘reframe’ 
violence through gentrification is described 
by Carter (2003). In an examination of how 
different forms of violence are praised or 
scorned in Belfast – namely boxing on the 
one hand, and street violence on the other – 
Carter states that a distinction should be 
made regarding the ethnic segregation in 
Belfast and the newer class-based 
segregation as embodied in gentrification. 
Carter explains that working class people are 
often not allowed to enter spaces such as the 
Odyssey, a shopping and entertainment 
complex – in Carter’s terms a “bourgeois, 
cosmopolitan social space designed for 
secure conspicuous consumption” 
(2003:271). When working class youths are 
allowed access, they are usually subject to 
higher levels of surveillance. There is a 
similarity here with the recognition of 
markers of ethnicity (Protestant or Catholic). 
Carter points out that within gentrified 
spaces such as the Odyssey, specific attire 
must be worn and behaviour displayed in 
order to pass unnoticed by security guards, 
and that deviation from these norms (for 
example unruly behaviour or wearing soccer 
shirts) often results in those involved being 
ejected from the property (2003). In a 
similar vein to Watson (2009), Carter also 
suggests that working class youths are 
sometimes brought to gentrified areas such 
as the Odyssey so that they are able to 
witness ‘discipline’ and to be part of what is 
considered a ‘civilised’ space – to be privy 
to “appropriate… middle class mores and 
values” (2003:270). 
Gentrification has also changed the 
nature of violent behaviour. Tying in with 
the work of Roche (2012) as mentioned 
above, Carter believes that although street 
violence in Belfast displays elements of 
sectarianism, this is not the only aspect of 
fighting that is worthy of note. In an 
observation of one particular riot in the 
summer of 2002, Carter posits that although 
the Catholic boys who started the riot (by 
throwing rocks at a bus) covered themselves 
with a fabricated story about provocation by 
Protestants, in fact what they had done was 
to seek the attention of the authorities, who 
when they attempted to keep the two ethnic 
groups from engaging each other as is 
standard police practice, then had the 
violence turned against them (2003). “That 
some of Belfast's riots” muses Carter, 
“contain an element of the celebratory and 
playful nature of other spectacles was 
emphatically evident” (2003:261). For 
Carter, young people's communal violence is 
explicitly connected to both the past and the 
present. There is something of a 'trick' going 
on here. Whilst street riots are usually 
portrayed by those taking part as occurring 
because of a dispute between opposing 
ethnic groups, Carter points out that more 
often than not, the confrontations themselves 
take place between young people and the 
police. With sectarian violence so high on 
the agenda in Belfast (because of the city's 
gentrification) the authorities must react to 
it, but in doing so, they themselves become 
caught in a different demonstration: one that 
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speaks against the exclusion of working-
class people from “an emerging 
cosmopolitan Belfast predicated on 
conspicuous consumption.” Carter continues 
by stating that “their appropriation of public 
streets for their own agendas challenges 
bourgeois conceptions and uses of urban 
space in Belfast.” (2003:276). 
 Smith (2002) believes that whilst 
gentrification started as “a seemingly 
serendipitous, unplanned process that 
popped up in the postwar housing market” 
(2002:439) it has now become part of the 
development strategy of many cities 
worldwide, and “the agents of urban 
regeneration thirty-five years later are 
governmental, corporate, or corporate-
governmental partnerships… [urban renewal 
is] ambitiously and scrupulously planned” 
(2002:439). In this sense, whilst early forms 
of gentrification were self-governed, 
gentrification as it exists today is, in many 
ways imposed on poorer urban areas.  
 Exploring the resistance to 
gentrification and the reaction to that 
resistance, Smith explains that gentrification 
is seen as ‘taking back’ or ‘revanching’ the 
urban landscape from people who do not 
deserve it: 
 
“The emergence of the 
revanchist city… was not just 
a New York phenomenon: it 
can be seen in the anti-squatter 
campaigns in Amsterdam in 
the 1980s, attacks by the 
Parisian police on homeless 
(largely immigrant) 
encampments, and the 
importation of New York’s 
zero-tolerance techniques by 
police forces around the 
world. In Sao Paulo, highly 
repressive tactics applied to 
the city’s street people are 
rationalised in terms of the 
‘scientific’ doctrine of ‘zero 
tolerance’ emanating from 
New York. In all of these 
cases, the new revanchism 
was explicitly justified in 
terms of making the city safe 
for gentrification.” (Smith 
2002:442) 
With this reclamation of cities comes a sense 
of ‘by any means necessary’. The middle 
class will mobilise any force they can 
against the working classes who are 
overtaking ‘their city’.  Gentrification is a 
process of making cities liveable, but who 
they are made liveable for is debatable, since 
Carter suggests “cities have always been 
‘liveable’ for the working classes” 
(2003:257). In Belfast, the reaction to this 
process can be seen in a ‘reinvention’ of 
sectarian violence by the working class; a 
reinvention which mirrors that of the middle 
class. However whereas the middle class are 
both capitalising on and sweeping away 
violence, in this context the working classes 
are using it as a tool to address the 
authorities in a different manner.  
 
Conclusion 
The literature shows that there is an 
immutable connection between violence and 
space. People learn to become visible and 
invisible depending on their locale and the 
threat of violence. This is a learned 
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experience, and one that is based on decades 
of segregation. The space around the 
peacewalls has itself become an area defined 
not by peace, but by violence. This is 
evident from the local classification of these 
areas in terms of conflict – 
“sanctuary/interface/adversary” (Feldman 
1991). The terms ‘sanctuary’ and 
‘adversary’ imply a fundamentally vicious 
relationship in that one is diametrically 
opposed to another – ‘the other’.  
 More recent work infers a different 
relationship between ethnic groups in 
Belfast. Whereas it is assumed – and often 
told – that there is very little interaction 
between Protestant and Catholic groups, the 
opposite seems to be the case. In addition, 
direct conflict between ethnic groups is 
being reconfigured by young people, 
especially men. Historical conflict has, at 
least in part, become a language through 
which modern day street fighting is 
articulated. The labels of past troubles 
become a way in which to incite a person to 
fight, or to gain an advantage in a struggle 
that has already commenced. Learning the 
labels that can add some ‘pow’ in turn 
become a way for young people to establish 
their identity amongst their peers (Roche 
2012). 
 More than that though, historical 
violence is being reconceptualised by young 
people as a method of expressing discontent 
against state efforts to simultaneously ‘brush 
over’ and capitalise on the Troubles. As 
Carter (2002) suggests, this notion of 
violence becomes one in that Protestants and 
Catholics are almost working together in a 
performance that is not directed against the 
other ethnic group, but is directed more 
towards the state. Although the two groups 
are aggressive towards each other, it is a 
rage designed to ignite reaction in state 
forces such as the local police. This is an 
incendiary remark in itself, although the 
literature is leaning in that way – for 
example Carter (2002) speaks about how 
Protestant and Catholic groups will often 
blame the other for starting a riot when in 
fact they are to blame themselves, and the 
intended vehicle for their violence are state 
forces. Whilst this cannot be seen as the 
basis for every violent act in the city, it 
should not be ignored as the basis for some 
of them.   
 While gentrification is often 
promoted as an attempt to combat poverty, 
in fact it frequently does the opposite – 
exacerbating the problem and moving it 
somewhere else, somewhere out of sight. In 
Belfast this is particularly problematic 
because the process involves the 
commodification of a long history of 
violence, and in many ways it feels like an 
irreverent progression. Perhaps though, by 
isolating and coming to terms with this 
troublesome past, a solution might be found. 
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